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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: BLUEPRINT FOR CONFUSION
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to Bills of Lading,' otherwise known as the Hague
Rules, were formulated in 1925 to bring uniformity and predictabil-
ity to the international shipping trade, which previously had been
burdened by the myriad laws and regulations of all the maritime
nations. Especially confusing before development of the Hague
Rules, were the exculpatory clauses in the bills of lading which,
given quite diverse treatment by the courts, left shippers without
effective protection from liability.
In 1936 the United States enacted the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act' (COGSA) which incorporated the language of the Hague Rules
almost without change. There is, however, one variation in the
wording of COGSA which has served to create havoc and uncer-
tainty in the very area to which COGSA and the Hague Rules were
designed to bring a measure of uniformity and predictability: the
limitation of carriers' liability for damaged cargo. The Hague Rules
limit a carrier's liability to a specific monetary amount "per pack-
* Attorney with the Anti-Trust Division, U.S. Justice Department, Washington, D.C.;
Former Senior Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Open for signature June 23, 1925, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155, 57
(effective Dec. 29, 1937). The United States became a signatory in 1936.
2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
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age or unit." Section 1304(5) of COGSA, on the other hand, provides
that a carrier's liability shall be limited to "$500 per package...
or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight
unit . . . unless the nature and value of such goods have been de-
clared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of
lading."3
Unlike the United States, Canada and many European coun-
tries adopted in their Carriage of Goods by Sea Legislation, the "per
package or unit" terminology of the Hague Rules,4 although they
failed to define either term. The courts of many of these countries,
however, have interpreted the word "unit" to be the same as a
-"shipping unit," and almost the same as a package, thereby produc-
ing a result radically different from that achieved in the United
States under COGSA. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of
Canada made the following statement:
[T]he natural interpretation of the word "unit" in the phrase
"package or unit" appears to be that it has been added in order
to cover parts of a cargo similar in a general way to a package,
but not strictly included in that term, which properly implies
something packed up or made up for portability and would there-
fore not include such a thing as a log of wood or a bar of metal.
The word "unit" has, it is suggested, been added in order to
embrace such things and not to extend the scope of the Rule to
bulk cargoes or parts thereof.5
The court held that an unpackaged tractor and generator were each
one "shipping unit" and therefore limited recovery to a total of
$1,000. The plaintiff's argument that the limit of liability should be
computed on the basis of $500 per unit of freight rate, as is done
under COGSA in the United States, was rejected. The court rea-
soned that the unpackaged units of less careful shippers should not
merit greater legal protection than that which prudently prepared
3. Id. § 1304(5) (emphasis added). The Hague Rules also provide for full liability if the
nature and value of such goods is declared by the shipper and included in the bill of lading.
4. See Code Com. Mar. art. 91. § IV(5) (Belgium); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, art.
IV(5) (Eng.); Act of (2 April) 2. 4. 1936 § 5 (Fr.); HGB § 660 (Ger.); NMC § 469 no. 5, as
amended by an Act of 26/8. 1956 (Neth.); Carriage of Goods by Water Act, CAN. REV. STAT.
c. 15 (1970) (Canada); Canada Shipping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 5-9 (1970) r. 5 of art. IV.
The words "freight unit" are found in section 105 of the Swiss Maritime Code, and
"parcel or . . . customary unit of the commodity" in section 118 of the Maritime Code of
the U.S.S.R. See E. SELVIG, UNIT LIMITATION OF CARRIER'S LIABILITY § 2 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as SELVIG].
5. Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chimo Shipping Ltd., [1973] Lloyd's List L.R.
257, 259 (Can.).
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packages received, and it further determined that the wording in the
Canadian Carriage of Goods by Water Act (COGWA) precluded an
analogy to COGSA because the words, "customary freight unit," in
COGSA were meant to change, not clarify, the meaning of the word
"unit" as it appears in the Hague Rules and COGWA.
Although there are few English, German or Scandinavian deci-
sions construing the word "unit,"' those which do so are in accord
with the decisions of the French courts which have tackled the prob-
lem extensively reaching much the same conclusion as the Canadi-
ans. In The Strasbourgeois,' for example, 500 casks of wine were
transported from Algeria to France, but two were found to be miss-
ing upon delivery. While the consignee argued that the carrier's
limitation of liability should be based on the hectoliter-each cask
containing six hectoliters-the court held instead that the relevant
unit was the cask.
In their effect, then, there is little difference between the con-
cepts of "package" and "unit" under the prevailing interpretation
of these words in the Hague Rules and national legislation based
directly upon them. If an item of cargo does not qualify as a "pack-
age," it may nonetheless be categorized as a "unit." The limitation
of the carrier's liability is $500 in either case. Under COGSA, how-
ever, a court's determination of whether an article of cargo is or is
not a "package" will crucially affect the amount which will be re-
covered in damages. Where even a few "customary freight units" are
involved, the limitation of liability may run into the thousands of
dollars; if only one "customary freight unit" is found, the carrier's
liability is but $500. Thus, the carrier's limitation of liability is
clearly more uniform and predictable under the wording of the
Hague Rules. Nevertheless, two interpretive problems do arise
under those rules: (1) whether bulk cargo constitutes a "unit" and
(2) whether the recently developed large shipping containers are
"packages" or "units."
The Hague Rules do not specifically include or exclude bulk
cargo from the liability limitation. The prevailing view in France,
Germany and the Scandinavian countries is that bulk cargo is sub-
ject to the limitation under article IV(5), whereas Canada and Eng-
6. Id., citing The Bill, 55 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md.), aff'd, 145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944), which
defined "per customary freight unit" as the "unit of quantity, weight, or measurement of the
cargo customarily used as the basis for the calculation of the freight rate to be charged." Id.
at 783.
7. SELVIG, supra note 4, at 46-54.
8. 1950 DMF 126 Oran F.2. 1949. (Feb. 7, 1949).
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land hold to the contrary? The French courts have calculated the
carrier's limitation of liability on the basis of weight, volume, or
other unit of measure in cases where the bulk cargo cannot be sepa-
rated into distinguishable "units." It is important to note, however,
that the "unit" on which the freight is adjusted-the relevant unit
in American cases-is not necessarily the unit on which calculations
will be made in the French courts."° There has been no confusion
over the treatment of bulk cargo in the United States under COGSA
because the terminology "per customary freight unit" is easily ap-
plicable to bulk caro."
Common, however, to the wording of both the Hague Rules and
COGSA is the second interpretational problem: whether containers
are to be considered as "packages" or "units." The problem is so
similar under both types of statutes that American decisions were
cited in support for the holding in a Canadian case 2 which recog-
nized that the container revolution has outdated the concepts of
"package" or "unit."
It is readily apparent from this brief introduction that Con-
gress, by changing the wording of the Hague Rules when adopting
COGSA, sacrificed uniformity of result with the laws of the coun-
tries which adopted the terminology of the Hague Rules. What may
not be quite so obvious is that Congress also failed to foresee the
definitional problems created in United States courts by the change.
"Packages" or "units" are simple and interchangeable concepts
9. SELVIG, supra note 4, at 39-40. See also note 5 supra and accompanying text.
10. Compare Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. M/V New Yorker, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1969), with Transports Maritimes de L'Etat v. Lesueur, 1949 DMF 11 Cour de Cassation 28.
4. (April 28, 1947), where, instead of the unit on which the freight rate was charged, the
kilogram was held to be the applicable "unit" in applying the limitation of liability to a cargo
of cordage because the cargo had been described in the bill of lading by weight only, i.e., as
40,000 kg.
11. See The Bill, 55 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md.), aff'd, 145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944), holding
that a ship's tank of oil shipped in bulk was not a "package." The court applied the "custom-
ary freight unit" limitation of liability: $500 per 1000 kg. To overcome the argument that "per
customary freight unit" in COGSA meant "shipping unit," evidence was introduced to show
the synonymous trade usage of "freight unit" and "freight rate." See Middle East Agency,
Inc. v. The John B. Waterman, 86 F. Supp. 487, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
The case which best illustrates the difference between COGSA and the Hague Rules in
this area is Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 155 F.2d
687 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 761 (1946) which held that liability on 698 pieces of
structural steel shipped in bulk, each weighing more than one ton, would be limited to $500
per 100 lbs. (the "customary freight weight"), not to $500 per piece. The courts in Europe
would likely have held that each piece was a "shipping unit," thereby limiting liability to
$500 per piece.
12. The Tindefjell, [1973] 2 Lloyd's List L. R.
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under the Hague Rules since they are both shipping units. But when
Congress rejected the term "unit" and replaced it with the "per
customary freight unit" standard of COGSA, the meaning of the
word "package" assumed a far more crucial role in determining the
carrier's liability. Congress exacerbated the situation by failing to
define the term "package"; as of yet, the courts have been unable
to prescribe a universally acceptable definition. The result is thus
a lack of uniformity not only on the international plane, but also at
the domestic level.
II. THE COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PURPOSE OF COGSA
In an attempt to conform their interpretations of the term
"package" with the underlying purpose of COGSA, many federal
courts in the United States have examined the legislative intent
behind its passage. Unfortunately, however, these courts have read
into the passage of COGSA different motivating factors, largely
because very little legislative history is available. 3 Confusion and
uncertainty have been the result. A determination that COGSA was
intended to benefit cargo interests has persuaded some courts to
apply a restrictive construction of the word "package" since the
"customary freight unit" method of computing liability usually fa-
vors cargo interests. Conversely, a view of COGSA as intending to
benefit carriers, or at least as a compromise between the interests
of shippers and carriers, has encouraged a more expansive interpre-
tation of the word "package" since the "customary freight unit"
method of computing liability usually works to the benefit of cargo
interests.
In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc. 4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the cen-
tral purpose of the Hague Rules, as incorporated by COGSA, was
to establish international uniformity in certain matters relating to
ocean bills of lading on a basis fair to ocean carriers, cargo owners,
insurers and bankers.'5 Yet the court did not view COGSA as an
unbiased statute. It added that COGSA modified the law existing
then to give greater protection to cargo interests in three significant
respects: (1) by placing the burden of proof on the carrier to show
13. See Aluminios Pozuelo, Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1968).
14. 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that a 36,700 lb. transformer on a skid did not
constitute a "package").
15. Id. at 962, citing Hearings on S. 1152 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 15 (1935) [hereinafter cited as 1935 Hearings].
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how the damage occurred and that the carrier was not responsible
therefor; (2) by giving owners of goods more time to file claims; and
(3) by placing a minimum liability on carriers which they could not
contract away and for which they could not charge increased freight
rates.'" If sympathy toward cargo owners can be read into this
court's view, it is consistent with the outcome of the case. Hartford
Fire represents a dramatic rejection of previous case law, especially
that embodied in Aluminios Pozuelo, Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator,7 a
case strikingly similar to Hartford Fire.
Shortly after Hartford Fire, the Ninth Circuit stated in Tessler
Brothers (B.C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line,'" that Congress had passed
COGSA in order to preclude carriers from drafting ocean bills of
lading with "all embracing exceptions" to liability and to obviate
the necessity for shippers to meticulously inspect the fine print on
the bill of lading on each occasion before shipping. In accord with
this view, some courts have emphasized that COGSA was intended
to protect the shipper from adhesion contracts resulting from the
carrier's stronger bargaining position.
Another viewpoint is that COGSA was designed to protect car-
riers by forcing shippers to declare a higher valuation and to pay
higher rates if they desired complete coverage for cargo worth more
than $500 per package or customary freight unit.20 Similarly, courts
have held that the purpose of COGSA was "to prevent 'excessive
claims in respect of small packages of great value,' but not to permit
carriers to escape liability for just claims."'"
The most accurate picture of the purpose behind the passage
16. Id., citing 1935 Hearings at 18, 47. See notes 18 and 19 infra and accompanying text.
17. 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that a 6,200 lb. press bolted to a skid was a
"package"). See Comment, Skidded Machinery, 2 RUrGERS CAMDEN L. J. 361 (1970).
18. 494 F.2d 438, 445 (9th Cir. 1974), citing Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong
Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
19. E.g., Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-
Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967), holding, however, in favor of the carrier that
television tuners shipped in nine pallets, each holding six cartons bound by metal straps,
constituted nine and not 54 "packages."
20. Caterpillar Americas Co. v. S.S. Sea Roads, 231 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 364
F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1964), holding that a tractor which was shipped unboxed and uncrated and
which was dropped while being unloaded under its own power was not a package but that it
did, nevertheless, constitute "one customary freight unit" and that, therefore, the carrier's
liability was limited to $500.
21. Nichimen Co. v. M/V Farland, 462 F.2d 319, 335 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting Stirnimann
v. The San Diego, 148 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1945). The same court, however, specifically
rejected the argument that COGSA was only intended to protect carriers from liability for
small packages of great value. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382
(2d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. XXX
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of COGSA is probably a combination of the aforementioned argu-
ments. COGSA was a compromise between the interests of carriers
and cargo owners. It set a bottom limit to the liability which the
carrier could contract away at a level which would not encourage
negligence or indifference on the carrier's part, and yet it provided
reasonable protection to the shipping industry.2 The "balance" was
struck in 1936 at $500 per "package" or per "customary freight
unit." This "balance," however, no longer exists. Inflation has so
worked to the benefit of the carrier through the years, that today
the protection which shippers receive is but a fraction of what it
once was. Advances in technology have also tended to benefit car-
riers because palletized and containerized cargo may under certain
circumstances be a package or one customary freight unit."
It is this contemporary imbalance which probably accounts for
the uncertain definition of the word "package." Under the guise of
"legislative purpose" in interpreting statutory terms ("package" or
"customary freight unit") which cannot be equated as easily as the
terms of the Hague Rules ("package" or "unit"), courts are cur-
rently struggling with the same basic conflict between shipper and
carrier that the legislature faced back in 1936.
III. DEFINITIONAL APPROACHES: THE MEANING OF "PACKAGE"
A clear, precise and predictable definition of the term "pack-
age" is necessary to insurers, bankers, cargo owners and carriers
alike. If an item of cargo is on the borderline between being a pack-
age and not being a package, insurers will have to charge more for
the increased risk embodied in that uncertainty. Also, the bill of
lading relating to such goods will be worth somewhat less to any
purchaser of commercial paper due to the uncertainty surrounding
the carrier's liability for the item of cargo represented by the bill of
lading. Carriers and cargo owners alike will tend to over-insure, or
if they try to outguess the courts and fail, they will have tended to
under-insure.
22. Cf. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). On remand, 346 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
23. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973);
Rosenbroch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Lucchese v. Malabe Shipping Co., 351 F. Supp. 588 (D.P.R. 1972); United Purveyors, Inc.,
v. MN New Yorker, 250 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Fla. 1965). But see Cameco v. Sullivan Security,
1974 A.M.C. 1853 (S.D.N.Y.); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp. 1373
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Inter American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated
Caribbean Transp., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Serrano v. United States Lines
Co., 238 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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A. Defining "Package" According to the Layman's Concept
Only recently have some courts agreed that the layman's con-
cept of an ordinary package is no longer the standard by which to
define a "package" under COGSA.24 But as late as 1958, in the case
of Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc.,25 the layman's
concept lurked about as a test by which to legally define a
"package." In Gulf Italia the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a 20 ton Caterpillar tractor, which had
been prepared for shipment with waterproof paper coverings over
some of its parts and with a partial encasement of the superstruc-
ture with wooden planking, was not a package. The tread portions
of the tractor were uncovered and the tractor was not attached to
skids. The lower court's decision had concluded that
the item damaged would not be considered a "package" under
any ordinary construction of the term. A large tractor, weighing
43,319 pounds, is not within the purview of the layman's view of
a "package."2
The court of appeals affirmed, but the oft-quoted dissenting opinion
of Judge Moore proved to be the harbinger of future decisions. He
emphatically argued that "[a] large tractor . . . is not within the
purview of the layman's view of a 'package.' However, a layman's
definition of a package would not be determinative here."27
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions have undercut Gulf Italia
and its limited concept of a "package." In Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd.
v. S.S. Navigator,2" a 6,200 pound press bolted to a skid without any
other preparation for transport was held to be a package. This time
the Second Circuit explained that a "package" in maritime law is
a word of art and that the parties are presumed to have understood
its consequences when they so described the press. In Companhia
24. E.g., Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1962),
holding that three rolls of steel, measuring 16' x 6' x 5' and weighing 321/2 tons each, com-
pletely enclosed in separate wooden cases, constituted only three packages, notwithstanding
their size and weight.
25. 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
26. Gulf Italia Co. v. The Exirca, 160 F. Supp. 956, 959 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nor., Gulf
Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
902 (1959).
27. Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1958)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
28. 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968). The court emphasized, however, that the press had been
placed on a skid and, therefore, "put up for transportation." Accord, Nichimen Co. v. MNV
Farland, 462 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that coils of steel weighing three to nine tons
each, strapped by metal bands, were packages). See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. XXX
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Hidro Electrica v. S.S. Loide Honduras,9 a district court within the
Second Circuit also questioned the validity of Gulf Italia and held
that five unwrapped gas circuit breakers which were fully visible
except for wooden crating covering the instrument panel, and taking
up 239 cubic feet of space each, were packages. Each was on a "form
of steel base" which was a permanent part of the circuit breaker.
While it appears that in the Second Circuit the layman's defini-
tion of a package has been buried for good, this view is not shared
across our continent. The Ninth Circuit, in Hartford Fire,'" seems
to have completely rejected Aluminios by holding that a 36,700
pound electrical transformer measuring approximately 13' x 11' x
71/2', attached by bolts to a wooden skid and not otherwise boxed
or crated, was not a package. The court reasoned that Congress had
not defined the term "package" even though it was aware that
technological advances such as pallets, which permitted the consoli-
dation of cargo, were in common use by 1936. The court further
reasoned that Congress had provided an alternative limitation of
liability for "goods not shipped in packages" and that, therefore,
industry-wide advancements such as the skid did not justify an
overextension of the statutory term "package." Thus, the court held
that "[slince no specialized or technical meaning was ascribed to
the word 'package,' we must assume that Congress had none in
mind and intended that this word be given its plain, ordinary mean-
ing."31
In the Ninth Circuit, then, the "customary freight unit" is a far
more prevalent method of computing the carrier's limitation of lia-
bility than is the "package" basis, making this court one of the most
hospitable to cargo interests. So restrictive is the Ninth Circuit in
its use of the "package" concept that it may be expected to require
that a "package" not easily lend itself to inspection of its contents,
notwithstanding its size. The court in Hartford Fire, cited Whaite
v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry.,32 an English case which "involved a
group of oil paintings placed into a four-wheeled wagon which had
sides but no top, such that the identity of the paintings themselves
was hidden, though it was clear that paintings were being trans-
ported."33 Since the contents could not easily be inspected, the
whole wagon was held to be one package despite its size.
29. 368 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
30. 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
31. 491 F.2d at 963.
32. [18741 L.R. 9 Ex. 67.
33. 491 F.2d at 963.
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Of course, it may be that the court in Hartford Fire, instead of
basing its decision on a layman's definition of package, was simply
loath to apply a $500 limitation of liability to an article as valuable
as an electrical transformer, despite the shipper's failure to exercise
his option to declare its value and secure full liability coverage in
return for a higher freight rate. It is interesting to note that in
Hartford Fire the Ninth Circuit did not hold the electrical trans-
former to be one "customary freight unit" as the Second Circuit
might well have held. 4 Instead, it showed its inclination to favor
cargo interests by noting that in the case of goods not shipped in
packages, "based upon the number of customary freight units ap-
plicable to the nonpackaged goods, liability could well exceed the
statutory limit of $500 per package."35
The desirability of applying the layman's definition of a "pack-
age" is dubious. In the shipping trade there are many types of cargo
which for purposes of COGSA should be labeled "package" or "non-
package." A rough categorization of possible types includes the fol-
lowing:
(a) cargo shipped in cases, crates, barrels, casks and any other
form of completely enclosed container;
(b) cargo shipped in wrappings, bags, sacks and other forms of
coverings which partly or wholly conceal the identity of the goods;
(c) cargo shipped on skids, frames, pallets, or tied together,
whether fully or partly visible;
(d) cargo shipped in units without any special preparation for
transport such as yachts, trucks, cars, bales, machinery, etc.;
(e) cargo shipped neither as a unit nor as bulk freight, such as
wood, cordage, steel bars, etc.;
(f) cargo shipped in bulk such as grain, ore and oil."8
Under the Hague Rules, types a through e (with a split as to f) would
be included as a "package or unit."" The layman's meaning of
"package," as used in Hartford Fire, would at best be limited to
types a and b.11 The Aluminios case would include category c as a
"package." Companhia seems to include, at least partly, goods in
34. See note 39 infra.
35. 491 F.2d at 962.
36. SELVIG, supra note 4, at 44.
37. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
38. The court turned to Websters' Third International Dictionary 1617 (1966), for a
definition which "though alone insufficient, provide[s] at least a starting point . . . : 'a
small or moderate sized pack: bundle, parcel . . . a commodity in its container . . . a
covering wrapper or container . . . a protective unit for storing or shipping a commodity.'"
491 F.2d at 963.
[Vol. XXX
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classification d. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Hartford Fire defers a
great deal of cargo in favor of the "customary freight unit" alterna-
tive to the $500 per "package" limitation. This view of "package"
is not only in conflict with the Second Circuit's decisions, but more
importantly, is inconsistent with the concept of a "package" as
formulated by the Hague Rules and its adherents. The Second Cir-
cuit not only applies a far broader definition of package than does
the Ninth Circuit, but when goods are found to be "not a package,"
it often holds that the cargo is but one "customary freight unit."3
The approach of the Second Circuit more closely approximates the
construction of "shipping unit" under the Hague Rules and there-
fore lends a bit more uniformity to the international shipping trade,
one of the purported aims of COGSA.
B. Appearance, Size and Weight
American cases generally agree that appearance, size or weight
have little, if any, bearing on the determination of whether an arti-
cle of cargo is a "package" under COGSA. In Primary Industries
Corp. v. Barber Lines,4" the court held that a bundle of 22 tin ingots
tied with metal straps was one package. The court emphasized the
preparation to facilitate handling and not the package's size, shape
or weight, nor whether the goods were enclosed. In accord was
Mitsubishi International Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State,4 where fully
boxed steel rolls weighing 32 1/2 tons each were declared packages
notwithstanding their size and weight. In Gulf Italia42 the court held
that any test dependent upon the extent of external covering would
lead to uncertainty and increased litigation. Moreover, in Nichimen
39. Accord, United Purveyors, Inc. v. MN' New Yorker, 250 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Fla.
1965), holding that damages for goods inside a freezer trailer would be limited to $500,
although the decision was unclear as to whether the freezer trailer was one "package" or "one
customary freight unit." See, e.g., Petition of Isbrandtsen, 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953),
holding that uncrated locomotives, although not packages, each constituted one "customary
freight unit" and thus only $500 per locomotive could be collected; General Motors Corp. v.
Mormacoak, 327 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), holding that each of two generators without.
skids or packaging preparation was one "customary freight unit." But see Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 155 F.2d 687 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 761 (1946), holding that where 698 pieces of structural steel were shipped in bulk
and each weighed more than one ton, liability was to be computed at $500 per 100 lbs.
40. 357 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974), citing Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Naviga-
tor, 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968).
41. 311 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1962). See note 24 supra.
42. 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); accord, Stirnimann v.
The San Diego, 148 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1945). See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
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Co. v. M/V Farland,43 the appellate court reversed the trial court
and held that whether they were wrapped in burlap or not, rolled
steel sheets in coils strapped with steel bands were packages.
It is submitted that considerations of appearance, size and
weight are inherent in the layman's view of a "package" as defined
by the Ninth Circuit in Hartford Fire. That court did not, however,
establish what criteria the layman should apply to define a package;
nevertheless, one can surmise that the layman would most likely
apply such standards as appearance, size and weight.
One disturbing foreign decision to note is that of F.LA.T. V.
American Export Lines." This Italian decision interpreting COGSA
held that a case containing 25 tons of machinery was not a package
and limited liability to $500 per 40 cubic feet of cargo. The court
reasoned that cargo was shipped in packages to facilitate the han-
dling, loading, stowing and discharging of goods, but that no such
consideration was applicable when the case weighed 25 tons. Al-
though not binding on any courts here, the case is a poignant re-
minder that uniformity and predictability within the domestic legal
system are necessary if foreign courts are to interpret American law
in cases where the rights of American citizens are at stake.
C. The Facilitation for Transport Test
The facilitation for transport test is one of the most frequently
used in determining whether certain cargo will be held to be a pack-
age. As the following discussion indicates, the test is a vague one
which allows courts to arrive at divergent results upon the slightest
factual nuances.
Black's Law Dictionary, often quoted in these decisions, pro-
vided the inspiration for this test. It defines a package as a "bundle
put up for transportation or commercial handling; a thing in form
to become, as such, an article of merchandise for delivery from hand
to hand. . . . As ordinarily understood in the commercial world,
it means a shipping package." 4 Generally, the preparation of cargo
for transport would bring goods under the definition of a package if
the preparation facilitated transport by allowing for easier lifting,
loading, storing, etc. Any evidence of preparation which tended to
protect the cargo was irrelevant to the determination of whether the
article was a package.
43. 462 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1972).
44. 1958 Il Dir. Mar. 570, 1960 Il Dir. Mar. 197, C.A. Genoa 15. 7. 1959 (July 15, 1959).
45. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1262 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (emphasis added).
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In Standard Electric, S.A. v. Hamburg Suedamerikanische
Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft,46 it was held that palletized cargo
which constituted an integrated unit for handling in transportation
was a package despite the fact that this technological innovation
went beyond the expectancies of legislators when they enacted
COGSA in 1936. The court recognized that packages were increas-
ing in size due to technological advancements and that this, in
effect, reduced the liability of carriers.
In Nichimen,47 hot rolled steel sheets strapped with steel bands
were held to be packages. The court viewed this as "some packaging
for transportation which facilitates handling" and glossed over the
plaintiff's argument that such strapping was done primarily for pur-
poses of warehouse storage. The court reasoned that the storage
function of such strapping did not preclude it from also facilitating
the transport of the steel rolls.
In Aluminios , a pound press was prepared for shipment bolted
to a skid. The court held that although the skid did to some extent
protect the machine, it served primarily to facilitate delivery and
to present the press as a package in a form suitable for transporta-
tion. This case is difficult to reconcile with Hartford Fire4" which
held that a 36,700 pound transformer bolted to a skid was not a
package. The Hartford Fire court, in specifically rejecting the facili-
tation for transport test, said:
Any distinction based upon the subjective purpose for which the
skid was attached should not be the test for resolving the issue.
The skid certainly protected the transformer to some extent...
[a]nd, the skid could have been utilized to facilitate the trans-
portation of the transformer. Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded
that by simply attaching the transformer to a wooden skid, the
shipper created a "package."50
The transformer already had four lifting lugs attached to its four
upper corners to facilitate its movement and transportation. It was
designed to stand freely on the ground but the shipper had placed
a heavy wooden skid on the bottom to protect the transformer.
Under the reasoning of Aluminios, it is difficult to speculate what
result would have been reached in Hartford Fire. Since the purpose
46. 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967). See note 19 supra. Compare this case with the reasoning
in Hartford Fire, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
47. 462 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968). See note 28 supra.
49. 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
50. 491 F.2d at 965.
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of the skid was primarily for protection, and the transformer needed
no preparation in order to be transported, the Aluminios court
might have held that it was not a package. Yet the very fact that
the skid could be utilized to facilitate the transportation of the
transformer, might have provided a sufficient basis on which to hold
that the transformer was a package.
In Gulf Italia,"' a Caterpillar tractor was held not to be a pack-
age despite extensive coverings made in preparation for shipment.
The tread portions of the tractor, however, were uncovered and it
was not attached to a skid. Judge Moore's dissent noted that the
tractor was "as carefully packaged as a tractor with protruding
treads could be." It seems ludicrous that the addition of a few un-
necessary pieces of lumber would have made it a package even
though the treads needed no protection and a skid would not have
added to the stability of the cargo. Ten years separate this decision
from Aluminios in which there was no other packaging preparation
but a skid.
Only six years after Aluminios, the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of New York decided Companhia.52 In this
case five huge gas circuit breakers, unwrapped except for some
wooden crating covering the instrument panel, were held to be pack-
ages. Since they were mounted on a "form of steel base," the defen-
dant carrier argued that the base was the equivalent of a skid which
facilitated handling and delivery. The plantiff argued that the base
was a permanent part of the circuit breaker. The court cited
Aluminios for the proposition that since the parties had described
the article in the bill of lading as a package and, in addition, had
prepared the article to facilitate its handling and transport, the
article would be deemed a package. This court, arguing that Gulf
Italia53 had already been discredited by both Nichimen and
Aluminios, viewed the crating on the instrument panel as sufficient
to satisfy the facilitation for transport test. Companhia, however,
goes far beyond Aluminios. Crating over an instrument panel hardly
facilitates the handling of a huge circuit breaker. The court in
51. 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959). See text accompanying
notes 25-27 supra.
52. 368 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See text accompanying note 29 supra.
53. In Gulf Italia the tractor had also been described as "one package" in the bill of
lading, and the preparation for transport was far more extensive than that which Companhia
concluded was enough to pass the "package" test. Compare Gulf Italia with Petition of
Isbrandtsen Co., 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953), holding that a locomotive stowed on rail and
timber beds, and secured by wire lashings, clips, and turnbuckles, was not a package.
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Companhia defended its reasoning by arguing that packaging, to
the extent that it protects cargo, also facilitates handling. There-
fore, it concluded, the distinction is without merit.
Companhia represents one of the furthest extensions of the con-
cept of "package." Its result is consistent with the terminology of
the Hague Rules, under which these circuit breakers would have
been "shipping units." The court in Hartford Fire, by adhering to
the most limited interpretation of "package" in American juris-
prudence, would not have defined each of these circuit breakers as
a "package" or one "customary freight unit."
Even the cases in which COGSA does not apply ex proprio
vigore are inconsistent in their application of a definition of "pack-
age." An additional complication in these cases is that COGSA is
made to apply only because the terms of COGSA have been incorpo-
rated into the bill of lading. The cases generally involve loss or
damage to cargo while at dockside or "on deck" where the jurisdic-
tion of COGSA does not extend by its own force. It remains unclear
whether the courts' definitions of "package" apply when parties
incorporate COGSA into their contract of shipment or whether the
parties are free to define a package themselves notwithstanding
hostile case law.
In General Motors Corp. v. S.S. Mormacoak,54 a generator was
enclosed in a weather proof metal housing and mounted on a rolled
steel base. The bill of lading had incorporated COGSA because it
was on-deck cargo. The court found that the generator, although
described in the bill of lading as a package, was not a package
because it did not have a skid or any packaging preparations. No
consideration was given to the fact that the generator, was by itself,
fit for transport. But the resulting amount of damages was the same
since the court found it to be "one" freight unit rather than a pack-
age and limited recovery to $500.
In the case of Island Yachts, Inc. v. Federal Pacific Lakes
Lines,55 a 42-foot yacht transported on deck was held to be a pack-
age. COGSA had been incorporated into the bill of lading and the
parties had described the yacht as a package. The court applied the
facilitation of handling test and found that the shipping cradle,
which allowed the cargo to stand upright in a stable position, quali-
fied as packaging preparation.
54. 327 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
55. 345 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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The Island Yachts court could very easily have circumvented
the definitional problem by holding, as did the court in Pannell v.
United States Lines Co.," that since COGSA did not apply to deck
cargo, the parties were free to define a "package" between them-
selves. Thus, the yacht was a package in this limited situation. In
dicta, however, the court commented that had COGSA applied ex
proprio vigore, the yacht would not have constituted a "package."
It is obvious, upon inspection of the aforementioned cases, that
even the facilitation of transport or handling test is not being uni-
formly applied by the circuit courts, adding to the unpredictability
of the meaning of "package." In Aluminios a skid was enough to
satisfy the test; in Island Yachts a cradle was enough; in Petition
of Isbrandtsen,57 however, a rail and timber beds with wire lashings
and clips were insufficent qualities to have the locomotive declared
a package. In the Mormacoak case, the generator was not a package
although it did not need any preparation since the unit was built
for transport. But, in Companhia, the court decreed that a covering
of the instrument panel satisfied the test, although it went on to
declare that preparation for protection and for transport were one
and the same concept.
The court in Gulf Italia was of the opinion that preparation of
goods for ocean transport did not automatically classify them as
packages. The court feared that such a rule would penalize those
who protect their shipments against damage. Since less extensive
packaging might provide a greater recovery under the non-package
"customary freight unit" computation of a carrier's liability, ship-
pers might be discouraged from taking precautions against damage.
The extension of the facilitation for transport or handling test to the
extremes which Companhia approaches, goes far to prevent such a
development. If the slightest covering satisfies the test, then a ship-
per would have to ship goods without the benefit of any preparation
whatsoever in order to avoid having his cargo designated as a pack-
age. As Companhia states, preparation for handling and transport
cannot be legitimately separated from preparation for protection:
they are attributes of a broader purpose. No shipper would be fool-
hardy enough to invite damage just to assure himself a greater re-
covery.
56. 263 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959). See also Van Breems v.
International Terminal Operating Co., [1974] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
57. 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Nevertheless, the majority of cases have not taken as far-
reaching a view as Companhia. In most, the dividing line between
packaging which passes the test and packaging which does not is
indefinable. It is in these instances that a shipper would be penal-
ized for his precautions in preparing cargo for shipment. In Gulf
Italia the court held that despite extensive packaging, the tractor
was not a package. Later cases have been less favorable to cargo
interests. With the liberalization of the facilitation for transport
test, more cargo with less packaging has been included within the
scope of a package. The fears expressed in Gulf Italia merely reflect
the true inadequacy of the test-its vagueness. Since Companhia is
not the decision of an appellate court, it does not have the full
weight of law. Thus, the dividing line between what is a package
and what is not remains undefined, and shippers who find them-
selves in the "twilight zone" of the test continue to be penalized for
that extra margin of preparation which tipped their cargoes into the
package status. Companhia in effect would eliminate the test; since
almost all units of cargo are prepared for shipment in one way or
another, they would all be packages.
D. The Applicability of the Bill of Lading Description As a Test.
1. WHENEVER COGSA APPLIES EX PROPRIO VIGORE.
With the increase in litigation concerning the definition of a
"package," the courts began to look beyond such tests as "facilita-
tion of handling or transport," perhaps because they recognized its
inadequacy. Thus, courts turned to the bill of lading in order to
determine whether or not the parties intended or understood the
cargo to be a package. This determination has been of secondary
importance in some cases but quite significant to the outcome of
others. Again, this uncertainty has proved to be unfair to both car-
riers and cargo interests since they cannot be sure how much im-
portance to ascribe to the bill of lading's description of the goods
being shipped.
In 1949 the landmark case of Middle East Agency, Inc. v. The
John B. Waterman" held that 11 tractors, uncrated and uncovered,
were not packages although the number "11" had been typed under
the bill of lading heading of "quantity or number of pieces or pack-
ages." The court decided that the use of the word "package" printed
on the bill of lading was not a stipulation by the parties that the
58. 86 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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tractors were packages under COGSA. In so holding, the court rec-
ognized and avoided a possible conflict with a provision in section
1304(5) of COGSA which provides that the carrier and shipper may
contract for a higher, but not a lower limit of liability in the bill of
lading. By defining an article of cargo to be a package because the
bill of lading described it as such, a court might in effect reduce a
carrier's liability below what was statutorily permissible on the
basis of the carrier's own contract where, by use of a more proper
test, the unit of cargo would not really be a "package." Thus, by
using the bill of lading as a test, the court would in such cases be
preventing a shipper from recovering his rightful share under the
"customary freight unit" measure of liability, which often greatly
exceeds $500. Indirectly, the court would be allowing carriers to
limit their liability contract in violation of Congressional intent.
Thus, the court warned: "Any attempt by the carrier to modify the
limitation provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act through a
printed provision of a bill of lading should be carefully scrutinized
by the courts."59 It should be emphasized that in this case the trac-
tors had no additional qualities that would categorize them as pack-
ages since they were uncrated, uncovered, and not on skids. This
court's warnings, however, were not heeded by subsequent courts.
In Gulf Italia the court held that an unskidded tractor was not
a package although it had waterproof paper over some parts as well
as a superstructure partially encased with wooden planking.' Faced
with far more "packaging" on this tractor than on the ones in
Middle East Agency,"' the court resorted to the bill of lading's de-
scription of the tractor as "semiboxed" to support its finding that
the tractor was not a package.
In Aluminios, 2 however, the court drew attention to the bill of
lading in support of its conclusion that a 6,200 pound press bolted
onto a skid with no other preparation relating to facilitation of han-
dling was a package. In this instance the number "One (1)" was
written into the column headed "No. of Pkgs." Thus, the court
reasoned that the parties had specified the press as "one package,"
which in maritime law is a word of art. The parties were presumed
to have understood the limitation of liability consequences of such
a specification.
59. Id. at 491.
60. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
61. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
62. 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968). See note 28 and text accompanying note 48 supra.
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Moreover, in Nichimen63 the court held that rolled steel coils
strapped and tied with steel bands were packages partly because the
parties considered each coil to be a "package" in light of the sales
contract, the bill of lading, and the common understanding between
the parties. In this case it seems that the facilitation of handling test
was only of equal importance to the specifications in the bill of
lading.
Similarly, a New York State court declared that 25 bundles of
22 tin ingots, each with metal straps resting in place on "grooves"
molded into the bottom ingots, were packages." This time the court
was forced to view the bill of lading with some selectivity because
under the bill of lading heading of "No. of pkgs." the number "550"
was typed in. Yet under the heading of "Description of Package and
Goods" was written: "Ingots Tin Ingots (in 25 Bundles, each 22
ingots) (Net weight 25,402 Kgs.) (Total Ingots 550 In 25 Bundles
Only)." The court focused solely on the "In 25 Bundles Only" provi-
sion to support its holding.
The furthest extension of the bill of lading description as being
dispositive of whether an article of cargo is a package is Companhia.
In this case the packaging preparation (wooden crating covering the
instrument panel on a large circuit breaker) could hardly pass the
prevailing interpretation of the facilitation of handling test.6" Find-
ing itself on uncertain ground, the court urged that the parties abide
by the bill of lading description which was merely the number "6"
typed into the column headed "Number of Packages." Citing
Nichimen," the court explained that although the bill of lading
description was not controlling, it was important evidence of the
parties' understanding.
Again, the case which stands out among the rest for its non-
conforming approach is Hartford Fire.67 In advocating the layman's
definition of "package," 8 the court impliedly rejected the "inten-
tion of the parties" as a test since the bill of lading description was
not discussed in the decision.
To reiterate, the main fault in giving weight to the bill of lading
description is that the parties themselves will, in borderline situa-
tions, indirectly determine whether the cargo is a package; the re-
63. 462 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1972). See text accompanying note 47 supra.
64. Primary Indus. Corp. v. Barber Lines, 357 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974).
65. 368 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See text accompanying notes 29 and 52 supra.
66. 462 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1972).
67. 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
68. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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suit may be that the carriers will generally prevail in the "close
cases." In several cases the bill of lading has been characterized as
an adhesion contract." The carrier who has the form printed accord-
ing to his specifications chooses the headings, and the shipper has
no recourse but to fill out the form according to such headings. The
carrier is in a better position to know the consequences of the use
of a word of art such as "package" in a printed heading. Not only
does it usually work to the carrier's advantage to label cargo as "one
package," but a shipper who is not in the business of shipping is far
less likely to protect himself with knowledge of the law.
2. WHENEVER COGSA DOES NOT APPLY EX PROPRIO VIGORE.
Unlike the Harter Act,7" which applies to cargo in the custody
of the carrier, COGSA holds the carrier liable for damages only
between and including the loading and unloading of cargo.7 Nor
does COGSA apply to on-deck cargo.7" The shipper and carrier,
however, may extend the applicability of COGSA by contract to on-
deck and dockside cargo in the custody of the carrier.73
As has previously been discussed,74 it is not clear whether par-
ties are free to define the term "package" even though they extend
the applicability of COGSA to on-deck and dockside cargo in the
bill of lading. An older Second Circuit decision75 states that the
69. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 15 (2d Cir.
1969); Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-
Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 351 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1971). The Harter Act is also applicable to dockside
cargo. See COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1311 (1971).
71. COGSA, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1301(e), 1307, 1311 (1971).
72. Id. § 1301(c). Where the bill of lading gives the carrier the option to carry the goods
on or below deck, but nothing in the bill of lading indicates which option the carrier has
exercised, the goods are not exempted from the operation of COGSA. Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969). Similarly, where the carrier gives
a shipper a clean bill of lading for a container of goods and the ship is especially designed for
container cargo in which containers are loaded above and below deck, stowage on deck is
neither an unreasonable deviation from the contract of carriage nor outside the reasonable
meaning of section 1304(4) of COGSA. DuPont de Nemours Int'l S.A. v. S.S. Mormacuega,
493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974).
73. The carrier and the shipper are also free to limit the liability of the carrier's agents,
such as stevedores, by incorporating such limits into the bill of lading. Sechrest Mach. Corp.
v. S.S. Tiber, 450 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1971).
74. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
75. Pannell v. United States Lines Co., 263 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1959). There was dicta to
the effect that had COGSA applied ex proprio vigore, the yacht would not have been a
package. Accord, The Margaret Lykes, 57 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. La. 1944), holding that an
unboxed truck carried on deck was a package where the bill of lading described it as such
and COGSA had been incorporated into the bill of lading.
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parties may stipulate in the bill of lading that a yacht to be carried
on deck is a package. More recently, however, a lower court76 in the
same jurisdiction has held that a generator without a skid or pack-
aging preparation was not a package even though the parties incor-
porated COGSA into an on-deck bill of lading and had described the
cargo as a generator. Thus, under this theory, COGSA may not be
modified once it is incorporated into the bill of lading where other-
wise COGSA would be inapplicable. Subsequently, the same court"
held that where the bill of lading described the cargo as an "un-
packed" sailing yacht, the carrier had precluded himself from the
benefit of the $500 liability limit and would therefore be liable for
$7,000. Although no mention was made of COGSA's incorporation
into the bill of lading, it must be assumed since the yacht was on-
deck cargo. Thus, the $7,000 recovery must have represented 14
customary freight units.
In a particularly confusing case from another circuit,7" the court
cited Aluminios79 and held that where the parties described the on-
deck yacht as a package, they were to be held to it since it was a
word of art. Yet the court also stated that the shipping cradle satis-
fied the facilitation for transport test. Although the result is similar
to the case which states that the parties are free to define a package
where COGSA does not apply ex proprio vigore, the very fact that
the facilitation of transport test was used implies that the parties
are not completely free to define a "package."
In Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 0 another case
within the Second Circuit involving the disappearance at dockside
of a container with bales of leather, the court invalidated a provision
stamped onto the bill of lading which read: "Shipper hereby agrees
that carrier's liability is limited to $500 with respect to the entire
contents of each container . . . ." The case stands for one or both
of two possible rules: (1) that a carrier may not limit his total lia-
bility to $500 once the court decides that the items inside the con-
tainer are packages, despite the fact that COGSA does not apply
ex proprio vigore;8' or (2) that parties may not define a package]
76. General Motors Corp. v. Mormacoak, 327 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See note
54 supra and accompanying text.
77. Van Breems v. International Terminal Operating Co., [1974] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 599
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). See notes 55 and 56 supra and accompanying text.
78. Island Yachts, Inc. v. Federal Pac. Lakes Lines, 345 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. 111. 1972).
See notes 55 and 56 supra and accompanying text.
79. 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968).
80. 313 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
81. The bill of lading had extended COGSA coverage to dockside cargo. COGSA prohib-
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(the container) for themselves in the bill of lading although COGSA
dose does not apply ex proprio vigore.
In the Second Circuit, then, there is only confusion, both within
and between the aforementioned cases in which COGSA was applic-
able by its own force; the holdings in Leather's Best and Mormacoak
are in opposition to those in Pannell and Van Breems. Therefore,
the coexistence of two incongruous and undesirable situations is
apparent: In a "borderline" case, the bill of lading's definition may
be the key factor in holding that an article of cargo is a package
when COGSA applies ex proprio vigore, and yet in another case,
where COGSA applies only by reason of the bill of lading's incorpo-
ration, the parties' description of the cargo as a package may be of
no legal significance at all. "Only if 'package' is given a more pre-
dictable meaning, will parties concerned know when there is a need
to place the risk of additional loss on one or the other accordingly
or to adequately insure against it." 2
E. The Container's Effect on the Viability of "Package" As the
Relevant Unit
Containers, as articles of transport equipment, are revolutioniz-
ing the shipping industry by allowing ships to load and unload cargo
efficiently at great speed, thus significantly reducing time spent in
port. Containers also reduce risk of damage to individual cargo espe-
cially during loading and unloading and give added protection to
the cargo on board ship during the voyage. Efficient container ships
are being designed in increasing numbers to take advantage of these
economies. Containers provide savings to the shipper as well by
lessening the need for packaging inside the container and helping
to reduce thefts.8 3 Containers are commonly made of metal and are
therefore durable and reusable.
The International Customs Convention on Containers84 defines
a conainer as follows:
its carriers from contracting for a lower liability per package than the $500 limit imposed. 46
U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1971). Cf. Royal Typewriter Co. v. MN Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.
1973), holding that a container stolen at dockside was a package notwithstanding the fact
that the bill of lading described the cargo as "1 container said to contain machinery."
82. Aluminios Pozuelo, Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1968), citing
Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375
F.2d 943, 947 (2d Cir. 1967). In contrast to COGSA, those cases governed by the Harter Act,
46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1971), give full weight to such contractual provisions.
83. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). See Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MARITIME L.
& COM. 507 (1974) for an excellent discussion of containerization and its legal ramifications.
84. 49 C.F.R. § 420.3.
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(c) "Container" means an article of transport equipment (lift-
van, portable tank, or other similar structure . . .), other than a
vehicle or conventional packaging-
(1) Of a permanent character and accordingly strong
enough to be suitable for repeated use;
(2) Specifically designed to facilitate the carriage of
goods by one or more modes of transport, without inter-
mediate reloading;...
(5) Having an internal volume of 1 cubic meter (35.3
cubic feet) or more."
The courts have yet to agree that a container is not a "pack-
age." In United Purveyors v. M/V New Yorker," a freezer-van con-
tainer broke down jn mid-voyage resulting in the spoilage of 839
boxes of frozen fish. The court did not indicate whether the van was
a "package" or one "customary freight unit," but it limited the
carrier's liability to $500. There are no clues to the basis for the
decision other than that the transport was charged at a flat rate of
$1,000, according to gross weight, the cheapest rate available.
United Purveyors influenced the court's decision in Lucchese v.
Malebe Shipping Co. , in which a trailer filled with household goods
was delivered to the carrier to be shipped at a flat rate which,
although the most economical rate to the shipper, had no relation
to the number of pounds or the value of the cargo. Flat rates are
offered in order to encourage shippers to containerize. The rate was
computed with reference to the trailer as a single unit, and no value
was declared by the shipper. The carrier was not aware of the nature
or condition of the goods inside. Thus the trailer was declared a
package. The decision is as unclear as United Purveyors as to why
shipping according to a flat rate, irrespective of the contents of the
container, can influence the determination that the cargo is a pack-
age. Carriers might construe the court's reasoning as advising
them that if they do not know the contents of a container and charge
a flat (lower) rate on it, the entire container will be declared a
package. Thus, under this case, carriers may subtly, but effectively,
contract for a lower liability by charging less for transport in avoid-
ance of the provisions of section 1303(8), COGSA, which declares
null and void any clauses which decrease the carrier's statutory
liability. If lack of knowledge of the contents was a key factor to the
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. 250 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
87. 351 F. Supp. 588 (D.P.R. 1972).
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decision in this case, it is without merit because all the carrier has
to do is ask.
The Lucchese court was obviously influenced by the container
provision of the protocol" passed at the second meeting of the
Twelfth Session of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law,
Brussels, February 19-23, 1968. It reads:
(c) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is
used to consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enu-
merated on the bill of lading as packed in such article of transport
shall be deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose
of this paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned.
Except as aforesaid, such article of transport shall be considered
a package or unit."
The above put the onus on the shipper to protect himself by describ-
ing the goods inside. Yet this protocol has never been the law;9
therefore the shipper cannot be expected to know about it. Thus, the
court should not have considered it to justify its decision against the
shipper.
In Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Trans-
port, Inc.," the court reached a far more desirable result. In this
case, involving the spoilage of a freezer-trailer of frozen shrimp, each
master carton within, consisting of ten five-pound boxes was held
to be a package. Unlike Lucchese, however, this carrier picked up
the cartons, loaded them into the trailer and gave a receipt for the
number of cartons inside. The decision was far easier to reach with
these additional factors.
Leather's Best92 has been hailed as one of the better decisions
relating to containers. A 40' x 8' x 8' container disappeared from a
New York pier after a voyage from Europe. The bill of lading, under
the column headed "number and kind of package," stated "1 con-
tainer said to contain 99 bales of leather." The carrier owned and
provided the container. 3 The court, in holding that each of the 99
bales was a package, opined that containers are provided primarily
88. In international law the first draft or rough minutes of an instrument or transaction
is called a protocol. Also so termed is any document serving as the preliminary to, or opening
of, any diplomatic transaction. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1388 (4th ed. 1968).
89. Lucchese v. Malebe Shipping Co., 351 F. Supp. 588, 595 (D.P.R. 1972).
90. Id. This protocol has not been submitted for ratification.
91. 313 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
92. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
93. See DeOrchis, The Container and the Package Limitation-The Search for
Predictability, 5 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 251 (1974).
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for the benefit of the carrier to reduce the loading and unloading
time by 90%, although the shipper also benefits through the reduc-
tion of expensive export packaging. Moreover, the bales had steel
straps around them to protect the goods and to qualify them as bales
under applicable tariffs.
It is unclear whether the court consciously considered that since
less packaging of containerized articles is needed, a broader defini-
tion of "package" might be appropriate such as one which approxi-
mates the concept of "shipping unit" as used in the Hague Rules.
The reality of such a necessity is evident, however. Had the bill of
lading in Lucchese described the household goods in detail and had
they been "unpacked," would each of the goods have been
packages?
The court which decided Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V
Kulmerland94 might have had this packaging problem in mind when
it formulated a new "test" to be employed in container cases. Unfor-
tunately, this test is impractical because it presents very difficult
problems of proof.95 In this case a container with 350 cartons of
adding machines was stolen while in storage. The container be-
longed to the carrier and the bill of lading description stated "1
container said to contain Machinery" without mention of how many
cartons were inside. In rejecting the two key bases for the decision
in Leather's Best, the court held that the consideration of which
party obtained the container and the description on the bill of lad-
ing were immaterial because the freight rate was the same whether
the bill of lading referred to just the container or the individual
cartons therein.
Instead, the court inaugurated a new two-tiered test: First,
when the contents of the container could have feasibly been shipped
overseas in the individual packages or cartons in which they were
packed by the shipper, the presumption is that the container is not
a package. Furthermore, to overcome this presumption, evidence
must be presented that the parties intended the container to be a
package. The 350 cartons in Kulmerland were single-wall corru-
gated cartons measuring 15" x 10" x 10" and thus could not have
been shipped individually. Therefore, to have had the presumption
in his favor the shipper would have had to incur needless and expen-
sive extra packaging. Since container packaging need not be as
94. 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973).
95. See Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 507 (1974)
for an excellent critique of the case. See also DeOrchis, supra note 93.
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strong or protective and is therefore cheaper, this first test will
seldom benefit the shipper. Second, if the units of cargo do not pass
the first test, the burden shifts to the shipper to show that the
"units" inside the containers are packages. At this point the parties'
intent, custom, trade usage, and characterization of the units be-
come relevant. This test leaves numerous questions unanswered.
Must a shipper prove that his units would have been packages had
he "packaged" them better? Does one use as a standard the usual
non-container package definitions as developed by totally incon-
sistent decisions? If the container includes various types of articles
packaged in different ways, are some to be proved packages and
others not? The test is counterproductive to the development of an
efficient shipping industry and discourages innovation in packag-
ing.
The court did not expressly overrule Leather's Best, but instead
chose to interpret the result as consistent with the new test-that
each bale could have been shipped individually and still have been
a "package.""6 What remains of Leather's Best, a decision consis-
tent with those of Canada and other countries which abide by the
Hague Rules terminology of "package or unit,"97 is difficult to dis-
cern. Rather than distinguishing Leather's Best from Kulmerland,
the court incorporated the former decision.
In Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines," the dis-
trict court chose to place Leather's Best and the facts of Kulmerland
on opposite sides of a spectrum in which Rosenbruch was some-
where in between. The court stated that in Leather's Best the carrier
was heavily involved in the preliminaries of providing the container,
supervising the loading operation, and giving a receipt for the bales
which indicated the exact nature of the contents of the container.
The court stated that "it is only where the shipper packs the con-
tainer or requests the carrier to do so that it becomes necessary to
96. The court implies that the bales would have been analogous to the steel coils in
Nichimen, supra note 21.
97. The Tindefjell, [1973] 2 Lloyd's List L.R., holding that the intention of the parties
is the key consideration, each case to be decided on its facts. Elements used to construe intent
are whether the carrier was on notice of the goods in the container and whether the bill of
lading specifies the contents. The court cited Leather's Best and distinguished Kulmerland
and Rosenbruch noting that in both of those cases the bill of lading included only a vague
description of the contents. The court said that containers are "merely a modern method of
carrying packages." French cases hold that a container is "transportation" equipment, an
"instrumentality of the shipping process." See Leather's Best v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 313 F.
Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d 800 (2nd Cir. 1971).
98. 357 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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consider whether or not there was a 'single package' under §
1304(5)." ' 1 In Kulmerland, however, the container belonged to the
shipper's agent who loaded it and sealed it before delivering it to the
carrier and the bill of lading did not enumerate the contents of the
container. The Rosenbruch court interpreted these facts as signify-
ing that the container was intended by the shipper to be the basic
cargo unit, and that the carrier was not on notice as to the nature
of the contents.
In Rosenbru.ch the container was held to be a package. The
shipper alone had loaded the container. In the bill of lading the
shipper had written the number "1" under the entry "Number of
Cont. and other Pkgs.," and the cargo description was "said to
contain household goods." The container was owned by the carrier
and furnished at the shipper's request.
Since the liability of the shipper and the carrier will shift with
the slightest factual nuance in determining the scope of the term
"package," one shipment will often be insured by both carrier and
shipper. Double insurance is inefficient and costly, especially to the
consumer. The larger the units of transportation become, however,
the more the carrier will benefit from the mistake or ignorance of
the shipper. A $500 limitation for a 40' x 8' x 8' container is unreal-
istic no matter what is described in the bill of lading, or by whom
the contents are described.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
COGSA was originally intended to strike a balance between the
interests of the shipper and those of the carrier. That balance is now
gone; it has been implicitly and explicitly tilted in favor of the
carrier. Inflation has magnified the imbalance. Larger shipping
units which run the risk of being labeled "packages" and the prac-
tice of containerization are steadily whittling away at the protection
afforded to shippers under COGSA as it was enacted in 1936.1"0
Packages then were smaller and often shipped individually. Cargo
was less sophisticated and therefore often less valuable. Since that
time, however, the General Agreement on Tariffs Trade' (GATT)
has increased dramatically the volume of international trade; more-
99. Id. at 985.
100. The value of the dollar in 1936 was 3.5 times that in 1974. Thus, by 1936 standards
the limit of liability should be $1750. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE U.S. (94th. ed. 1973).
101. J. EVANS, U.S. TRADE POLICY, NEW LEGISLATION FOR THE NEXT ROUND (1967).
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over, palletization, containerization, and mechanization have made
the shipping industry more profitable and efficient by decreasing
the time spent at dockside loading and unloading individual items.
Cargo interests recover only $500 in inflated currency if dam-
aged cargo is deemed a package. Knowing that the facilitation of
transport test is the one most frequently used by the courts, a ship-
per may sacrifice protective packaging in order to benefit from the
"customary freight unit" method of computing the carrier's liabil-
ity. Yet with courts increasingly looking to the bill of lading to
determine the parties' intent, the shipper may be limited to a $500
recovery notwithstanding the customary freight unit method of
computation since the court may decide that the cargo is merely one
"customary freight unit." In view of the fact that such intent is
often determined by the bill of lading's description under the head-
ing of "number of packages," the carrier often benefits from the
shipper's lack of knowledge when the shipper fills out the bill of
lading. Moreover, since the bill of lading forms are generally printed
by the carrier, he is in a position subtly to influence the way in
which the cargo is described in that document merely through the
wording of the column headings. When the courts give weight to a
typed-in figure under the column headed "No. of Pkgs." as ostensi-
bly evidencing the intent of both parties, they may in fact be enforc-
ing only the intent of the carrier. 102
Clearly, "package" is not a "word of art" in the trade or there
would not be such confusion as to its definition. Those in the trade
cannot rely even on one jurisdiction's definition because the pecu-
liarities of admiralty law allow in rem actions wherever the ship may
be found. 03 For example, if insurance is procured relying on the
vague definitions of "package" provided by the Second Circuit,0 4
but an in rem action is filed in the Ninth Circuit, °5 that miscalcula-
tion could cost a great deal of money. Thus, confusion in the law
and differences between jurisdictions within the federal court sys-
tem itself, engender the wasteful practice of double insurance for the
same goods. The carrier and shipper may both overinsure fearing
that they will not be adequately covered for an unforeseen turn of
events.
102. Other courts, however, may select what they wish out of the bill of lading descrip-
tion. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
103. See GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALITY § 9-85 (2d ed. 1975).
104. For the Second Circuit's viewpoint in Aluminios, see text accompanying notes 48
and 62 supra; for its view in Companhia, see text accompanying note 65 supra.
105. For the Ninth Circuit's viewpoint in Hartford Fire, see text accompanying notes 49,
67, and 68 supra.
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Another possibility for confusion is exemplified by the case of
a shipper who does not declare the value of his cargo because he
mistakenly believes that the "customary freight unit" method of
computing the carrier's liability covers his goods completely. When
the question arises in litigation, however, his cargo is deemed one
"package" or one "customary freight unit" and he recovers $500, a
fraction of what he honestly expected. In Stirniman v. The San
Diego,' the court spoke of this very problem. In that case a large
locomotive was held to be one "customary freight unit" due to its
size and its description in the bill of lading. Had the locomotive
been smaller, the rate charged would have resulted in far more than
one "customary freight unit." The carrier in these situations has too
much control over his own liability because he determines the rate
to be charged which the courts look to in order to compute liability
under the "customary freight unit" alternative. The bottom limit
of $500 was intended to bring some benefit to the shippers, not to
render invulnerable the carriers who, prior to the enactment of
COGSA, totally disclaimed their liability by contract. It should be
remembered that the purpose of the Hague Rules and its American
counterpart, COGSA, was to bring uniformity to the international
shipping industry.
A. A Judicial Solution
As the concept of a "package" has expanded, it has progres-
sively incorporated more types of cargo, which under the Hague
Rules would have been "shipping units." Since such is the case, a
simple but very effective solution to the package problem is avail-
able to the judiciary. If the courts would hold that henceforth
"packages" are to include "shipping units," and leave the "custom-
ary freight unit" measurement to apply exclusively to bulk and
similar cargoes, not only would predictability return to the law in
this field but American decisions would then be more harmonious
with those of Canada and many European countries.
There is no reason why this interpretation cannot be incorpo-
rated into COGSA. Congress did not define either term in COGSA,
and the legislative history is scant. The courts, especially the Su-
preme Court, could easily graft the proposed definition onto the
word "package." The Supreme Court should grant certiorari on this
question at its next opportunity simply because of the totally differ-
106. 148 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1945).
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ent definitions given by the Second and Ninth Circuits."°7 The pro-
posed extension of the meaning of the word "package" would not
be so drastic in view of the many types of cargo which are already
held to be packages in violation of the ordinary sense of the word.
Moreover, many items which are found not to be packages are often
held to be one customary freight unit. Thus, while the results would
not differ greatly, they would at least be predictable and parties
could protect themselves with insurance accordingly.
As to containers, many of the present problems would become
moot. There would no longer be the need for strained tests such as
the one instituted by Kulmerland.I°5
B. Legislative Solutions
Congress has a wide range of alternatives available to improve
upon the wording of section 1304(5) in COGSA. The litigation high-
lighted in this comment could be avoided merely by returning to the
"package or unit" terminology of the Hague Rules. All the parties
concerned would be able to protect themselves accurately against
loss by insurance if the carrier's liability was evenly applied to all
types of cargo.
Congress (and all maritime nations) should also consider
changing the $500 limitation to one not based on an absolute dollar
figure.'"9 Since inflation tilts any fixed limitation of liability in favor
of carriers, a new limitation should be inflation-proof. It should be
set high enough to insure that carriers will not be indifferent to the
damage they cause intentionally or negligently, but low enough to
protect and encourage the growth of the shipping trade. One very
effective inflation-proof method would be for Congress to tie the
limit of liability to a stated percentage of the value of the cargo.
Basing the carrier's liability on the value of cargo is a far more
sensible method than the present one. Since losses in these cases are
always of an economic nature, the carrier's liability is a form of
insurance to the shipper since the carrier is taking some of the risk.
Limiting that risk, though, is a form of insurance to the carrier.
Since insurance is a method of protection based on the value of
107. See notes 104 and 105 supra and accompanying text.
108. 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note 94 supra.
109. The Maritime Law Association of the United States has recommended a $662 per
"package" or 90 cents per pound limitation where the number of packages or units is specified
in the bill of lading. MARITIME LAW ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE BILL
OF LADING COMMITTEE, Doc. No. 529 at 5632 (June 1968).
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goods lost or damaged, and not the freight rate or the description
of the goods, it seems that it is far more logical to base the limitation
of liability on the value of goods.
Presumably, under this proposed system, the following varia-
bles would be considered in determining the freight rate: the weight
of the cargo, the volume which it displaces on board, the length of
time in transport, the cost of loading and unloading and its value
upon declaration. The variables of weight, volume and time in
transport are directly related to the carrier's profit margin per voy-
age. The value of the goods would affect the freight rate only be-
cause it would effect liability, as limited by the above proposed
statutory percentage of value. The carrier's premiums for the insur-
ance that insulates it from such liability would eventually be passed
on to the consumer (the shipper) in the form of higher rates. Con-
versely, the carrier who minimized his losses would also pass prem-
ium savings on to the consumer by lowering his freight rates. The
added charge would thus depend upon the carrier's computation of
the risk he would take in transporting the unit of cargo, given the
accounting profit he would derive from shipping that particular
item. Therefore, the added charge for a small, light "package" of
great value would be higher relative to the carrier's cost of transport-
ing it than his added charge for a large, heavy package of equal
value, despite the fact that, in absolute dollar figures, the rate
charged for both packages might be the same.
Under the present system, cargoes of low value are totally or
substantially covered by the $500 limit of liability, especially if
liability is computed under the "customary freight unit" method for
"non-packages." It follows that cargoes of great value are hardly
protected by the $500 limitation, especially if the items are deemed
"packages" or one "customary freight unit." Thus, the units of
cargo of low value are automatically "insured" by the carrier's lia-
bility, as limited, or at least substantially more so than items of
great value. Shippers of high value cargoes must either insure their
cargo themselves, or pay the carrier a higher freight rate upon their
declaration of the value of the cargo."' Under the present system in
either event the shipper actually bears the whole cost of insurance.
He either pays the equivalent of a premium when he is charged a
freight rate which inherently includes the carrier's expected liability
costs, or he insures independently, either by declaring value and
paying a higher rate, or by paying through his own underwriter.
110. COGSA, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1971).
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Confusion in the present state of the law, however, engenders
unnecessarily high freight rates because carriers must protect them-
selves from the possibility of liability. The carrier's underwriter
must take into account the possibility of a finding of liability in
another court even where there would be none in the "home jurisdic-
tion." Predictability of the parties' legal positions would help to
bring down insurance costs.
Diseconomies are also fostered on the shipper's side. He too,
must insure himself against the same uncertainty should a court
decision be adverse to his interests and expectations. There is the
possibility, therefore, of duplicating coverage for the same uncer-
tainty. If the shipper does not protect himself with his own insur-
ance, due to the mistaken belief that his shipment is already "in-
sured," (i.e., that his cargo falls under the non-package customary
freight unit liability valuation method) he becomes a victim of his
own imprudence in light of the contradictory case law.
Under the proposed solution these problems would be solved.
Although the risk of loss would continue to fall ultimately on the
shipper, his insurance premiums would more accurately reflect that
risk; such premiums, however, would no longer include a premium
for the risk incurred by the confusing state of the law. Since the
freight rate would include the carrier's insurance costs, the shipper
would indirectly pay for the entire insurance on the cargo shipped.
The carrier's liability would merely provide the incentive to gain a
competitive advantage over other carriers by reducing costs asso-
ciated with payments for loss or damage. Beyond the carrier's limi-
tation of liability, the shipper would self-insure directly, either
through his underwriter, or by paying a higher freight rate in return
for coverage through the carrier.
The "value" of all cargo will have been declared by the shipper
upon the carrier's request because carriers would demand such a
declaration of value in determining the proper freight rate. The
shipper would be legally and equitably bound by the lower of the
value he declared, or the fair market value of the goods in question
on the date of damage at the place where the dispute is litigated."'
The fair market value ceiling would effectively preclude a fraudu-
lent shipper from sealing already damaged goods and declaring an
artifically high value, so that the carrier's liability on the percentage
111. This requirement would avoid costly evidentiary problems arising out of disputes
concerning what value should be used: value at place of shipment, at place of destination,
etc.
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of the value declared would equal the true value of the goods. The
shipper, therefore, would not be able inexpensively and fraudulently
to transfer his losses to the carrier by "insuring" them after the
goods are in fact damaged. Proscribing such potential fraud would
help keep insurance rates on packages of great value at their true
market level.
The most attractive aspect of this proposed change, however,
is that it eliminates the costly and unnecessary litigation which
arises when the limitation of liability depends on the definition of
cargo, rather than its value. With liability based on value, goods
would not need to be classified or defined: "borderline" cases would
exist but the courts would not have to devise complex and unrealis-
tic tests to define and classify goods in transport. No longer would
courts have to strain legal definitions in order to apply them to new
and unexpected developments in the shipment of cargo. "' The limi-
tation of liability would no longer be subject to inflation. Instead,
there would exist a constant and predictable formula for risk alloca-
tion without the inherent inefficiencies of the present system.
112. Cf. Comment, Skidded Machinery Held to be a "Package" for Purposes of Limita-
tion of Carrier's Liability Under Section 415 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1304(5)(1964), 2 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 361, 373 (1970).
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